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Gym Operators

In defense of Peloton

My defense of Peloton is that getting back to profitability matters more than trying to repeat its pandemic growth. My case is that getting the financial household in order after an impossible pandemic growth curve matters more than pretending that curve was ever sustainable.

Key takeaways

  • Peloton became the symbol of connected fitness because it rode the pandemic demand shock higher than its peers, then absorbed the backlash when that demand normalized.
  • The turnaround case rests on improving losses, positive free cash flow, lower debt, pricing power and a more focused set of bets.
  • Fiscal 2026 brought Peloton its first full year of profitability, alongside higher adjusted EBITDA, stronger free cash flow and sharply lower net debt.
  • The caveat is significant: Peloton entered fiscal 2027 with declining subscribers, higher fourth quarter churn and guidance for lower revenue.
  • The editorial view is that fixing the financial household before restoring growth is a meaningful management win, even if Peloton never returns to its pandemic scale.

Nine years of this show, close to a thousand conversations, and almost all of it has been interviews. I really like interviews. This month I released my first solo format to cover a very specific and interesting evolution within our industry.

It's very easy to take shots at Peloton. A lot of people do. Most of them have never run a company that size, and none of them have run a fitness company through a once in a lifetime pandemic.

So I made the case for the defense. Here's the short version.

*One note before we get into it. I recorded this in early July. Four weeks later (Aug 6), Peloton closed the books on fiscal 2026 and reported their first profitable quarter…EVER. More on that below.

This was never a story about Peloton

It's a story about connected fitness as a category. Peloton, Tonal, Mirror, a dozen others. Investors went bananas in 2020-2022 because nobody knew what was coming. Gyms were shut down. People were saying the gym industry was dead (they were wrong). Home fitness hardware stopped being a side bet and became the whole thesis.

The only thing Peloton did wrong is they were the best at it. Best product, clearest audience, most households, most revenue. That made them the poster child on the way up and the poster child on the way down.

The praise and the hate were never really about how well Peloton ran their business. They were about how much people still believed in the home fitness story.

The curve was never real

2019 IPO: $29 a share, 500,000 subscribers. Then COVID hits and this thing becomes a rocket ship. Subscribers go up 6x to 3 million in four years. Quarters throwing off around $100 million in EBITDA. Stock hits $170. They didn't have to market a thing. Demand was outrunning what they could ship.

That was never a normal growth curve. It was a once in a lifetime demand shock in a category that was never built to hold it.

The scattershot era

By late 2023 the stock has cratered from $170 down toward single digits and they're throwing darts, hoping something sticks. A $6,000 treadmill nobody had room for. An abandoned retail push with Amazon and Dick's. $75 million a quarter on R&D. A $100 million a year music deal. University of Michigan and Liverpool FC tie-ins. Barry McCarthy comes in and inherits a company built on assumptions that only made sense during COVID.

By our July 2024 report there was no permanent CEO at all. We referred to it as the “ghost ship.”

Then it got boring, in the best way

December 2024. Peter Stern comes in from Apple, Time Warner Cable, and co-founding Apple Fitness+. A subscription guy, not a fitness industry retread. EBITDA up over 1,000% year over year, from $9 million to $115 million. Alex's read at the time was fair: that's a bloat story, not a turnaround story.

May 2025. Revenue down 13% to $586 million, but net loss improves from $167 million to $48 million. Subscription revenue up 5% to $445 million while hardware fell 39%. Five straight quarters of positive free cash flow. Proof the membership base was the real asset the entire time, not the equipment.

December 2025. First price increase in years, $44 to $49.99. Churn barely moved. That's real pricing power in a loyal base, and they'd left it untouched for years. Small focused bets instead of wide ones: a breathwork app, an injury prevention partnership with Hospital for Special Surgery, and the launch of Peloton IQ.

March 2026. Net loss narrows from $92 million to $38.85 million. Net debt down 52%. Peloton IQ rolls out to the full member base and about half of active members use it in the first quarter it's available.

August 6, 2026, four weeks after I recorded this. Fiscal 2026 closed with $63.2 million of GAAP net income. That's the first full year of profitability in Peloton's history. Adjusted EBITDA $468.2 million, up 16%. Free cash flow $377.6 million, up $54 million. Net debt down 80% to $92.6 million, which takes net leverage from 1.2x to 0.3x. Revenue landed $6 million above their own guidance range, and they beat the $100 million run-rate cost savings plan they'd promised.

And here is the part I'm not going to skip, because it's the strongest argument against me. Fiscal 2027 guidance is $2.3 to $2.4 billion, a decline of about 4%. Subscribers ended at 2.553 million, down 247,000 or 8.8%, with Q1 guided down another 9.8%. Fourth quarter churn was 2.2%, up 100 basis points from the prior quarter.

So they're profitable and shrinking at the same time. Both are true. I'd argue the profitable part was the harder thing to do, and it's the part nobody else in the category managed.

They got the financial household in order before they figured out how to grow again. That order matters, and it's a sign of solid management.

The bottom line

This was a test of whether pandemic era home fitness was a permanent shift or a moment in time. It turns out it was a moment in time. A strange one.

The real question was never whether Peloton could keep growing at COVID rates. It was whether they could be the company that handled the comedown better than anyone else in their space. Losses shrinking, debt way down, real cash flow, low churn, and disciplined bets instead of darts.

They may never be a 10 million member growth stock again, and the category will most likely never look like 2021 again either (I don't think we want that). But a profitable, stable, iconic brand with 2.55 million loyal subscribers, one that outlasted and out executed every other company in the space? I say that's a win.

Watch the full breakdown

Frequently asked questions

Why does Eric Malzone defend Peloton?

Malzone's editorial view is that Peloton should be judged by how it handled the collapse of pandemic era demand, not by whether it maintained an extraordinary growth curve. He points to shrinking losses, positive cash flow, lower debt, pricing power and fiscal 2026 profitability as evidence of disciplined management.

What changed in Peloton's financial performance?

The newsletter traces improving losses, five straight quarters of positive free cash flow by May 2025, lower net debt and stronger EBITDA. It culminates with fiscal 2026 GAAP net income of $63.2 million, adjusted EBITDA of $468.2 million and free cash flow of $377.6 million.

Is Peloton growing again?

Not according to the figures presented here. Fiscal 2027 revenue guidance called for a decline of about 4%, subscribers finished fiscal 2026 down 8.8%, and fourth quarter churn rose. The central argument is that Peloton has achieved profitability while shrinking, rather than having restored subscriber growth.

What does Peloton's turnaround say about connected fitness?

Malzone's editorial argument is that the pandemic home fitness surge was a temporary demand shock rather than a permanent growth curve. In that framing, Peloton's test was not sustaining COVID era expansion, but managing the comedown through cash flow, debt reduction, lower losses and more disciplined investment.

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